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Abstract: This paper revisits some classic thought experiments in which experiences 
are detached from their characteristic causal roles, and explores what these thought 
experiments tell us about qualia epiphenomenalism, i.e. the view that qualia are 
epiphenomenal properties. It argues that qualia epiphenomenalism is true just in case 
it is (nomologically) possible for experiences of the same type to have entirely different 
causal powers. This is done with the help of new conceptual tools regarding the concept 
of an epiphenomenal property. One conclusion is that it is not obvious if qualia 
epiphenomenalism is false; and it is also not obvious what should make us believe that 
it is false---or for that matter, true. Connections between qualia epiphenomenalism, 
physicalism and nonphysicalist property dualism are further explored.  
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I. Introduction 
I want to revisit some classic thought experiments in which we are asked to imagine cases 
where experiences are detached from their characteristic causal roles. My aim is to show that 
we have so far failed to see what these thought experiments tell us about whether experiences 
have epiphenomenal properties; this I do with a new set of conceptual tools that I propose we 
should employ regarding the concept of an epiphenomenal property. For the reasons that I will 
elaborate on, I think we should pay special attention to the case of the madman and his mad 
pain. So, let me open with this case:  
[The madman is] a strange man who sometimes feels pain, just as we do, but whose 
pain differs greatly from ours in its causes and effects. … His [pain] is caused by 
moderate exercise on empty stomach, … turns his mind to mathematics, facilitating 
concentration on that but distracting him from anything else. Intense pain has no 
tendency whatsoever to cause him to groan or writhe, but does cause him to cross his 
legs and snap his fingers. He is not in the least motivated to prevent pain or get rid of 
it. (Lewis 1980: 216, emphasis added) 
Lewis, in imagining mad pain, alongside Martian pain (which is identical to our pain in how it 
feels, what kinds of events it is caused by, and what kinds of events it causes, but is grossly 
different in its physical realization), aims to show that neither a simple functionalist theory nor 
a simple (psycho-neural) type-identity theory can be true. The former fails to accommodate 
mad pain, the latter Martian pain. The correct theory of mind-body relations should account for 
both mad pain and Martian pain being pains, Lewis argues. My aim in reopening the case of 
mad pain is not to assess functionalism, the type-identity theory, or Lewis’s own proposal. I 
am interested in what the story of the madman tells about the causal role of the painfulness of 
pain.  
By ‘painfulness of pain’, I mean a property of a mental state. The mental state in question is a 
state token (i.e. a particular event), not a state type. This property (painfulness) belongs to a 
group of properties that are properties of some mental states in virtue of which those mental 
states are experiences. When there is something that it is like to be in a mental state M, we say 
that M is a phenomenally conscious mental state (or simply, M is phenomenally conscious). 
When there isn’t anything that it is like to be in M, we say that M is not phenomenally 
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conscious. Although nothing hinges on this assumption, for ease of articulation of certain 
claims, I will take it that all and only phenomenally conscious mental states are experiences. 
The properties that make mental states experiences are typically called ‘qualia’; so by ‘qualia’, 
I will mean such properties. The bearers of qualia are experiences, which are particular events. 
Surely there are qualia tropes whenever phenomenally conscious mental state types are 
tokened; but in the terminology I employ here, qualia are themselves property types (and not 
tropes). My question here is what it takes for qualia to be epiphenomenal.  
Let qualia epiphenomenalism (QE) be the view that qualia are epiphenomenal properties (i.e. 
properties without causal powers). It is important to clarify that QE is not the view that 
experiences cannot be causes. Let’s call this latter view SQE (‘S’ for ‘Strawman’). I will 
assume, at least for the sake of this paper, that SQE is obviously false. We say that the 
madman’s pain differs from our pain in its causes and effects; we say that it causes the madman 
to cross his legs and snap his fingers. In so doing, we attribute causal powers to a pain 
experience. More generally, we are happy to accept that experiences can be causes (or parts of 
causes). So, it is worth emphasising that QE is not the view that experiences are 
epiphenomenal; it is the view that the properties of experiences in virtue of which experiences 
are experiences are epiphenomenal. There is a relevant distinction here between token-
epiphenomenalism and type-epiphenomenalism (see McLaughlin 1989). Whereas token-
epiphenomenalism holds that mental events (as particular instances of event types), are causally 
inefficacious, type-epiphenomenalism holds that even if such events may have causal powers, 
their falling under mental types have no role in this. I believe that SQE is a form of token-
epiphenomenalism (applied to experiences), whereas QE is a form of type-epiphenomenalism 
(applied to qualia). This is in line with my suggestion above that qualia are property types. 
QE may be false. But it is not obviously false. Moreover, not only is it not obvious that it is 
false, it is also not obvious what should make us believe that it is false---or for that matter, true. 
In what follows, I will explore this. This will show that even when philosophers associate 
(rightly, I shall argue) nonphysicalism about qualia with QE, they do it for the wrong reasons. 
The link between nonphysicalism and QE is subtler than many of us have thought. Showing 
this will also reveal surprising results regarding the cases of absent qualia and inverted qualia.  
II. From Nonphysical to Epiphenomenal? 
The question of QE famously comes up in Jackson’s (1982) presentation of the knowledge 
argument against physicalism. I anticipate that anyone who is reading these pages will be 
familiar with the knowledge argument and the thought experiment about the captive 
neuroscientist Mary, so I will be very brief in my exposition. We are told that prior to her 
release from the black-and-white room, Mary knows all physical facts about colour perception; 
after her release, she learns something new about colour perception (namely what it is like to 
see something red); therefore, there are nonphysical facts about colour perception. From these, 
we are asked to conclude that qualia are nonphysical properties. After all, what was left out 
from Mary’s complete physical knowledge of colour perception was her knowledge of colour 
qualia, something she acquires after her release. If colour qualia were physical, her knowledge 
of all physical facts about colour perception would have covered them. Or so argues Jackson.  
For the sake of exploring its consequences, let’s accept that the knowledge argument is sound 
and that qualia are nonphysical properties. Curiously, Jackson associates this conclusion with 
the view that qualia are epiphenomenal. Having argued that qualia are nonphysical properties, 
he feels the burden to show that it is not so implausible that qualia are epiphenomenal 
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properties. What is not immediately clear, to me anyway, is why qualia have to be 
epiphenomenal if they are nonphysical properties.  
We see an explanation of the link from qualia nonphysicalism to QE in Lewis’s (1988) 
discussion of the knowledge argument. Lewis argues that ‘if something nonphysical sometimes 
makes a difference to the motions of physical particles, then physics as we know it is wrong 
… To believe in the phenomenal aspect of the world, but deny that it is epiphenomenal, is to 
bet against the truth of physics’ (ibid.: 95). So, if ‘phenomenal aspects’ (qualia) are nonphysical 
properties, they had better be epiphenomenal, argues Lewis.1  
The line of reasoning here is reminiscent of the much-discussed causal exclusion/closure 
argument against dualist and non-reductive physicalist views about the mind (e.g. Kim 1998). 
The argument goes, roughly, as follows. The physical domain is causally closed in that every 
physical effect (that has a cause at t) has a sufficient physical cause (at t). If some property P 
is not identical with some physical property, then, in order to cause some physical effect E, P 
(and some physical property) must causally overdetermine E. But such causal 
overdetermination is unacceptable, as it would imply systematic causal overdetermination. 
Therefore, the argument concludes, if mental properties are not physical properties, they must 
be epiphenomenal---they are causally excluded by physical properties. This argument is 
usually presented as a reductio against dualist and non-reductive physicalist views, as it 
allegedly corners such views into accepting an epiphenomenalist conclusion, which they 
typically want to avoid.  
It is not clear to me that this argument is successful in forcing nonphysicalist dualists into an 
epiphenomenalist conclusion. Notwithstanding the controversial assumption that there is no 
systematic causal overdetermination, the denial of the causal closure of the physical is an open 
alternative for nonphysicalist dualists. This doesn’t mean that nonphysicalists must deny the 
causal closure of the physical; but they can. In fact, it is not uncommon to find a nonphysicalist 
philosopher explicitly doing this. (See O’Connor 1994; Lowe 2013: 168-9; and to some extent, 
Chalmers 1996; 2003.) So, when looking for the link from nonphysicalism to QE, we shouldn’t 
appeal to a principle that is questioned by nonphysicalists.  
Is there another way to link the knowledge argument (or the associated thought experiment) to 
QE? Campbell (2003: 262), in arguing against Jackson’s epiphenomenalist dualism, 
reconstructs what he takes to be Jackson’s implicit argument. According to how Jackson 
expects us to understand this thought experiment, we must grant to Mary a complete 
understanding of all the physical causes and effects of colour stimulation on normal perceivers. 
This is meant to imply that she doesn’t notice any mysterious causal gaps at the physical level. 
Given this physical completeness assumption, we are then asked to infer that there is no room 
for additional nonphysical causes.2 But again, this is just another way of saying that unless 
qualia are physical properties the only way they can have physical effects would be by means 
of systematic causal overdetermination. However, if the choice is between QE and systematic 
causal overdetermination, it is not clear to me that the nonphysicalist has to choose QE (over 
causal overdetermination).  
So, the knowledge argument and the associated thought experiment don’t seem to give us QE, 
even if we were to accept them. What is worse is that there is at least an apparent tension 
                                                          
1 It is worth emphasising that, unlike Jackson, Lewis doesn’t think that that qualia are nonphysical or 
epiphenomenal, but he agrees with Jackson that if they are nonphysical, then they are epiphenomenal. 
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee here for helping me with this interpretation.  
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between the associated thought experiment and QE, as others have also observed (Watkins 
1989; Campbell 2003). The tension is that the conclusion of the knowledge argument (that 
qualia are nonphysical properties) is supported by the supposition that Mary acquires 
knowledge of qualia (phenomenal knowledge) when she is released, and according to these 
authors, there is something mysterious (if not incoherent) about acquiring the knowledge of 
something which is epiphenomenal. Now, this criticism seems to assume a causal theory of 
knowledge, and it is questionable if this assumption is warranted.3 In what follows, I shall try 
to steer clear of issues about theories of knowledge. But what I can’t steer clear of is 
metaphysics, as under what conditions qualia, qua properties, should turn out epiphenomenal 
is ultimately a question about the metaphysics of properties. 
III. Epiphenomenal Properties 
Having seen that being nonphysical doesn’t make qualia epiphenomenal, we are led to wonder 
what can make them so. We can’t answer this before settling, more generally, what makes a 
property epiphenomenal.  
Although ‘epiphenomenalism’ in philosophy of mind is often used to refer to the view that 
mental properties don’t cause physical events (which may suggest that they can have 
nonphysical---perhaps mental---effects), an epiphenomenal property, more generally, can be 
understood as a property without any causal power. There is reason to formulate QE with this 
understanding of an epiphenomenal property, rather than one which is restricted to only 
physical effects. Suppose we understand QE as the view that qualia don’t have causal powers 
to contribute to physical effects, but have causal powers to contribute to nonphysical mental 
effects. Call this RQE (‘R’ for ‘Restricted). On the face of it, RQE is unmotivated. Think about 
putative possible nonphysical mental effects of qualia (on the assumption that RQE and 
nonphysicalism about the mind are true): a belief about one’s own experience, or a desire to 
satisfy one’s need for something. Assuming such mental states may have physical effects 
(because neither RQE nor, more generally, QE is committed to wholescale mental 
epiphenomenalism), from transitivity of causation, qualia will inevitably contribute to physical 
effects, contradicting the core thesis of RQE.  
So, to begin with, I shall take the question of what makes a property epiphenomenal to be the 
question of what makes a property fail to have any causal power (rather than merely any 
physical causal power). The flipside of that question is that of what it is for a property to have 
some causal power. Only after settling under what conditions a property may be said to have 
some causal power can we settle the question of under what conditions it may not. In answering 
this question, the view I shall endorse is that properties, as abstract entities, don’t really have 
causal powers, but their bearers (i.e. concrete particulars) really do have causal powers. 
According to this view, if there is a specific nomological link between having a property P and 
having some causal power C, then P can be said to have C (derivatively of its bearers). The 
nomological link in question is that of nomological necessitation. That is, if the possession of 
a property P nomologically guarantees the possession of a causal power C, then (and only then) 
C should figure in the causal profile of P. This implies, I think correctly, that properties have 
the same causal profiles in worlds that are governed by the same laws of nature, and that if 
laws of nature guarantee that the bearers of a property must have some causal power, that causal 
power should figure in the causal profile of that property (in worlds that are nomologically 
                                                          
3 See Nagasawa (2010) for related discussion. 
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alike).4 If laws of nature hold necessarily (rather than contingently), arguably, this claim of 
nomological necessitation will be equivalent to a claim of metaphysical necessitation.5 
Appealing to these observations, we can thus characterise the notion of an epiphenomenal 
property, as a first approximation, as follows:  
(EP) A property P is epiphenomenal if and only if there is no causal power C such that 
it is nomologically necessary that all bearers of P have C.  
That is, if it is nomologically possible for some bearers of P to share no causal power 
whatsoever, then, and only then, P is epiphenomenal. I believe that this is a plausible way to 
think about the notion of an epiphenomenal property. As realists about properties, we want 
properties to ground similarities of objects. Properties with causal powers should therefore 
ground the similarities of the causal powers of their bearers. And conversely, properties without 
causal powers should be those that do not ground any such causal similarities. I admit that there 
is quite a bit of a metaphysical baggage here, and it is predictable that, under different 
assumptions about properties, laws, and causation, epiphenomenal properties will be 
understood in different ways. It is not surprising that different metaphysical views about these 
concepts lead to different assessments of QE. I don’t think there is any shame in this though, 
as even those who may disagree with these metaphysical views can find something interesting 
in what those views lead to in the assessment of QE. 
In presenting EP above, I said that it was a first approximation. This is because it needs to be 
modified in order to avoid trivial results whereby no property is epiphenomenal. Assuming that 
there may be causal powers that are, as a matter of nomological necessity, shared by all concrete 
particulars, EP leaves all concrete properties (i.e. properties of concrete particulars) non-
epiphenomenal. (I don’t know what those causal powers would be, but it is epistemically 
possible that there may be some.) Now, that there are no epiphenomenal properties is a 
defensible claim, and in fact, it is what the Eleatic Principle would have us believe. But in 
discussing whether qualia are epiphenomenal or not, we shouldn’t assume the Eleatic Principle. 
(How anticlimactic would it be to discover that qualia are not epiphenomenal because ‘to be is 
to have causal powers’?) In resolving this, we can make a distinction between first-class and 
second-class causal powers. Second-class causal powers are powers that are shared by all 
nomologically possible concrete particulars. (They are second-class, not because they are less 
real or less fundamental, but because there isn’t any privilege accrued by having them.) Any 
causal power that is not a second-class causal power is a first-class causal power. In line with 
this, we can restrict the account of epiphenomenal properties to first-class causal powers. So, 
epiphenomenal properties are those properties whose instantiations don’t nomologically 
necessitate the possession of any given first-class causal power. 
Perfectly unproblematic examples of epiphenomenal properties in this sense are tautological 
properties, such as being-red-or-being-non-red. Since everything has this property, it is 
                                                          
4 This also allows for the possibility that different properties may share some causal powers. In 
particular when there are nomological necessitation relations between properties, on this view, the 
necessitated property ‘inherits’, so to speak, its causal powers from its bearers. As argued in Baysan 
(2016), I believe it is a virtue of this view that it makes certain cases of causal overdetermination 
intelligible and unproblematic.  
5 There is more to be said on these matters, but a proper treatment of these will take us too far afield. 
Elsewhere, I argue for this view by eliminating several alternatives (Baysan 2018; forthcoming). 
Apparent objections to this view (e.g. from co-extensional properties) are dealt with in Baysan (2018: 
425-6). 
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possible to have instances of this property that share no causal similarities whatsoever.6 
Perfectly unproblematic examples of non-epiphenomenal properties in this sense would be 
first-class causal powers themselves. Such properties can be expressed by predicates of the 
form ‘has the power to φ’. 
The dichotomy between perfectly unproblematic cases of epiphenomenal properties and 
perfectly unproblematic cases of non-epiphenomenal properties seems to mirror the dichotomy 
between perfectly non-natural properties and perfectly natural properties. Now, there is 
something to be said that the latter is a false dichotomy, as a property can be natural without 
being perfectly natural (Lewis 1983). Likewise, a property can be non-natural without being 
perfectly non-natural. We might think that perfectly natural properties are those that ground 
perfect resemblances among instances, whereas natural, but not perfectly natural, ones are good 
indicators of resemblances among their instances, but do not ground perfect resemblances.  
If the latter dichotomy is a false one, might the former be a false one too? That is, does it make 
sense to think of properties as more (or less) epiphenomenal than others? In what follows, I 
will consider the possibility that it does.7 So, I propose that what I said above should be an 
account of perfectly epiphenomenal properties. Just as we might think that a property can be 
natural without being perfectly natural, we might want to say that a property can be 
epiphenomenal without being perfectly epiphenomenal. If the only causal powers that the 
possession of a property nomologically guarantees are relatively superficial and non-natural 
causal powers, it makes sense to think that the property in question is, epiphenomenal, but not 
perfectly so. 
This is an explicit departure from what appears (to me) to be a widely shared intuition that 
being epiphenomenal is an ‘all or nothing’ matter. Let me anticipate the following objection. 
‘A property is either epiphenomenal or not-epiphenomenal. It is like being pregnant; either you 
are pregnant, or you are not; there is no middle ground!’ I have two things to say in response 
to this objection. First, I am not denying the law of excluded middle; it is true that for any 
property P, either P is epiphenomenal, or P is not epiphenomenal. What I am suggesting is that 
among those properties which are epiphenomenal, some may be more epiphenomenal than 
others. Second, I would like to think that ‘pregnant’ and ‘epiphenomenal’ are interestingly 
different concepts. We have a good grasp of ‘pregnant’ (though we could do better!), and it 
would be odd to speculate from the armchair as to how we should understand this concept. But 
things are different for ‘epiphenomenal’. This is a philosophical term of art, it has different 
meanings in the writings of different philosophers, and it surely isn’t odd to speculate from the 
armchair as to how to understand it. The claim that properties could be more (or less) 
epiphenomenal than others shouldn’t be dismissed offhand. In fact, although the phrases ‘more 
epiphenomenal’ and ‘less epiphenomenal’ may not have been used, the very idea of proposing 
to understand qualia as epiphenomenal with respect to physical effects but not with respect to 
nonphysical effects (as per RQE, discussed above) seems to be friendly to the idea that 
epiphenomenalness can come in degrees.8 In the beginning of this section, I dismissed that idea 
when it comes to formulating QE. But nevertheless, the very existence of that idea goes to 
                                                          
6 One might question the viability of this example by suggesting that such properties are not genuine 
properties. I want to sidestep this question because even if one were to think, understandably, that 
tautological properties are not genuine properties, that they are epiphenomenal can be serviceable for 
that conclusion. 
7 In previous work (e.g. Baysan 2018), I had not considered this possibility. It now appears to me that 
this possibility has important implications regarding QE (as I shall argue in Section VI). 
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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show that the suggestion that epiphenomenalness can come in degrees is at least intelligible. 
For what it is worth, in what follows, I will put this suggestion in use. 
In mentioning relatively superficial and non-natural causal powers, I am thinking about cases 
where we would have to design idiosyncratic machines or come up with thought experiments 
to find causal powers that can be attributed to properties. Think about the property of being-a-
red-bus-or-a-seven-inch-gecko. Are there any first-class causal powers that are shared by all 
nomologically possible bearers of this property? Well, if you design a machine that says ‘forty 
two’ whenever it detects a red bus or a seven-inch gecko, then all bearers of being-a-red-bus-
or-a-seven-inch-gecko will have the causal power to make this machine say ‘forty two’. The 
causal power in question is definitely not a second-class causal power. (It would be a very 
strange world if all concrete particulars had this causal power!) But there is a sense in which 
this causal power is quite fishy. In fact, let’s call such relatively superficial and non-natural 
causal powers ‘fishy’. Fishiness is then a limit case of being a causal power of a property. 
Unfortunately, any attempt to give a more precise formulation of what makes a causal power 
fishy (i.e. relatively superficial and non-natural) seems to fail. I invite the reader to reflect on 
what kinds of causal powers she is happy to take as natural and which ones she is not, and take 
such intuitions on board. In sum, I am tempted to think that being-a-red-bus-or-a-seven-inch-
gecko is an epiphenomenal property, but not a perfectly epiphenomenal property because it 
nomologically guarantees the possession of only fishy first-class causal powers.  
IV. Epiphenomenal Qualia 
When introducing the question of QE above, I suggested that we can assume that SQE is false: 
experiences are not epiphenomenal. We can debate whether this is a defensible claim, but it is 
important to note that the question of QE is a separate one. Experiences are instantiations of 
mental properties, and such properties are properties of persons, organisms, and suitably 
complex systems which can have relatively rich mental lives. (Henceforth, I will stick to 
‘persons’ for ease of expression, but I don’t mean this to suggest that only persons can have 
mental properties.) So, the bearers of such mental properties are persons. In holding that mental 
properties of persons are not epiphenomenal, one should not thereby be committed to the claim 
that qualia are not epiphenomenal, as the bearers of qualia are not persons, but mental states of 
such persons. Just to emphasise: the bearers of qualia are experiences, not persons. If mental 
properties of persons indeed have causal powers, that doesn’t mean that the properties of their 
instances must have causal powers too.  
Recall that in order to decide whether a property is epiphenomenal, we must consider the causal 
powers of the bearers of that property. The bearers of qualia are experiences. So, to examine 
whether a given quale is epiphenomenal, we must look at the causal powers of the experiences 
that instantiate that very same quale. On the account proposed here, an individual quale Q is 
perfectly epiphenomenal just in case it is nomologically possible that there are experiences 
that instantiate Q which share no first-class causal powers in common. That is, if it is 
nomologically possible that there are experiences that instantiate the same quale but share no 
first-class causal powers, then (and only then) that quale is perfectly epiphenomenal. Let’s now 
qualify QE to be the view that qualia are perfectly epiphenomenal.  
Do we have good reasons to think that qualia are perfectly epiphenomenal in light of this 
criterion? What sorts of cases (or the nomological possibility thereof) might support QE? In 
exploring this, I will consider cases of absent qualia, inverted qualia, and (what I shall call) 
mad qualia. As I will argue---contrary to what may appear to be a natural thought---cases of 
absent and inverted qualia are irrelevant to the question of QE.   
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V. Absent Qualia 
Absent qualia cases are traditionally discussed in relation to functionalism about mental 
properties (see Block & Fodor 1972; Block 1980; Shoemaker 1975; 1982). Suppose that the 
causal profile of being in pain is such that its instantiation is caused by inputs I1, I2 … In, causes 
states S1, S2 …Sn and behavioural outputs O1, O2, … On. According to functionalism, 
necessarily, a person is in pain just in case she is in a state that meets this causal profile. 
Suppose that there is a person, Zed, who is in a state that is caused by inputs I1, I2 … In, causes 
states S1, S2 …Sn and behavioural outputs O1, O2, … On. But for Zed, there is nothing that it is 
like to be in this state. Now consider Ned, who is in the same causal/functional state as Zed, 
but for Ned, there is something that it is like to be in this state. Whereas Zed’s mental state 
instantiates no qualia, Ned’s mental state instantiates a quale, say, painfulness. (Ned’s situation 
should be familiar to anyone who has felt pain.) In the terminology employed here, whereas 
Ned’s mental state is an experience, Zed’s is not.9 Ned and Zed’s case is a typical case of absent 
qualia: functionally isomorphic states of two individuals, one state instantiates a quale, the 
other doesn’t. With the assumption that pain couldn’t be pain without being painful, it is 
arguable that if Zed’s case is metaphysically possible, then functionalism about pain is false.  
It is natural to think that if there could be cases of absent qualia, then qualia must be (perfectly) 
epiphenomenal, as it doesn’t look like Ned’s mental state’s instantiation of painfulness is 
adding any causal powers to that mental state. We know from Zed’s case what causal profile 
that mental state would have had if it hadn’t instantiated a quale: the very same one that Ned’s 
mental state has. As natural as this thought might be, it is unfortunately a misleading one. Based 
on the account of epiphenomenal properties employed here, painfulness is perfectly 
epiphenomenal just in case it is nomologically possible that there are painful experiences that 
share no first-class causal powers in common. So, to test whether a quale is epiphenomenal, 
we need two (or more) experiences with the same quale. But if qualia are absent from a mental 
state, that mental state is not an experience. Therefore, absent qualia cases, even if they are 
nomologically possible, don’t give us cases to examine QE. This is an interesting result that is 
worth paying attention to---and perhaps worth considering an objection against. 
Here is one objection. If, on my view, the possibility of absent qualia doesn’t show that qualia 
are (perfectly) epiphenomenal, then my view must be mistaken. Let’s see what is guiding this 
objection. Setting aside qualia momentarily, consider the following case. Suppose we have two 
objects, a and b, with precisely the same causal powers C1, C2, C3, and C4. Moreover, a and b 
have also the same properties, P1, P2, P3, P4, with only one difference: a also has the further 
property Q, whereas b lacks Q. On the face of it, the possibility of this case seems to suggest 
that Q is an epiphenomenal property. Having Q isn’t making any difference with respect to the 
causal powers of a (just as having painfulness is not making any difference to the causal powers 
of Ned’s mental state, if Zed’s case is possible). But I think we should resist this conclusion. 
The case is very abstract, so it is hard to imagine what the relevant causal powers of Q might 
be, but it can be shown schematically that it is possible that although Q doesn’t make a 
difference to the causal powers of a, it may not be epiphenomenal as it may happen to confer 
C1 (or any other causal power that is conferred by P1, P2, P3, or P4). There is no rule that the 
very same causal power can’t be conferred by different properties. I have the causal power to 
                                                          
9 As an anonymous referee rightly points out, it is possible for Zed’s mental state to be an experience 
even if it fails to instantiate painfulness, as it should possible that one experience can have numerous 
qualia. For this thought experiment to depict a case of absent qualia (so that we can assess the thought 
experiment), I will assume that the counterpart experience of Ned instantiates only painfulness and no 
other qualia.  
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reach my toes. I can manifest this power by using either my left hand or my right hand. That I 
can exercise this power by using my right hand doesn’t mean that my having a left hand is not 
conferring me the causal power to reach my toes. 
VI. Inverted Qualia 
Inverted qualia cases, like absent qualia cases, are also widely discussed in relation to 
functionalism. In an inverted qualia case we have two persons, let’s say Ned and Ted, whose 
mental states don’t differ in their causal profiles but differ in their qualia. Let’s say that both 
Ned and Ted are having visual experiences upon looking at first a green screen, and then a red 
screen. Let’s suppose that they are disposed to form the same beliefs and elicit the same 
behavioural responses upon these two experiences. But, let’s imagine that what it is like for 
Ned to see something red is different from what it is like for Ted to see something red, and in 
fact identical to what it is like for Ted to see something green. And likewise, what it is like for 
Ned to see something green is different from what it is like for Ted to see something green, and 
in fact identical to what it is like for Ted to see something red. In other words, Ned and Ted’s 
red and green visual experiences are qualitatively inverted.  
It is less obvious (if obvious at all) that if inverted qualia are metaphysically possible, 
functionalism must be false. Shoemaker (1975; 1982), while defending functionalism, admits 
that inverted qualia cases are metaphysically possible, but goes on to argue that similarity and 
difference relations between qualia can be causally/functionally characterised. In order for Ned 
and Ted’s qualia inversion to be functionally indiscernible, Ned and Ted must be making the 
same similarity and difference judgements regarding colours. That is, if asked whether orange 
is more similar to red than green, both should give the same response (which goes to suggest 
that, for functionally indiscernible colour qualia inversion, we need the inversion of the entire 
colour spectrum, not only a pair of colour qualia). If this is true, although individual qualia 
cannot be given causal/functional characterisations, their similarities and differences can be. 
Or so argues Shoemaker. Again, my concern is not whether functionalism survives the 
possibility of qualia inversion. I am interested in whether there is an argument from the 
possibility of inverted qualia to epiphenomenal qualia. 
In an inverted qualia case, we seem to have two discrepancies (relative to normal cases). First, 
we have different qualia accompanying experiences with identical causal profiles. Different 
qualia are instantiated by Ned’s visual experiences of seeing something red and Ted’s visual 
experiences of seeing something red, but Ned’s and Ted’s visual experiences of seeing 
something red have identical causal profiles. Second, we have the very same quale 
accompanying experiences with different causal profiles. The quale that accompanies Ned’s 
visual experiences of seeing something red is identical in type with the quale that accompanies 
Ted’s visual experiences of seeing something green, but the visual experience of seeing 
something red and the visual experience of seeing something green have different causal 
profiles. One is caused by red objects and causes beliefs and verbal reports about red objects; 
the other is caused by green objects and causes beliefs and verbal reports about green objects. 
The first of these discrepancies, like in the case of absent qualia, is irrelevant to the question of 
QE. For qualia to be epiphenomenal, we need the possibility of the same quale being 
instantiated by experiences that have different causal powers. But the second discrepancy gives 
us such a possibility.  
Now, the second discrepancy gives us a case of qualitatively identical experiences with 
different causal powers; but it doesn’t give us a case of experiences with entirely different 
causal powers. Arguably, despite differing in some of their causal powers, the visual experience 
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of seeing something red and the visual experience of seeing something green will share some 
causal powers too. For example, both a red and a green chip will stand out in a bunch of white 
chips, suggesting that the experiences caused by them will share some causal powers, e.g. the 
causal power to discriminate the odd chip. This goes to show that even if inverted qualia were 
nomologically possible, such possibility would not show that qualia are perfectly 
epiphenomenal; their bearers (experiences) share some first-class causal powers.  
But I have argued that a property may be epiphenomenal without being perfectly 
epiphenomenal. If the only causal powers that are shared by Ned’s and Ted’s experiences that 
bear the same quale are fishy (i.e. they require idiosyncratic machines or thought experiments 
to be discovered), then the quale in question can be epiphenomenal without being perfectly 
epiphenomenal. Does the imagined scenario of inverted qualia show that the relevant 
experiences share only fishy causal powers? I don’t think so. The causal power of an experience 
that enables its subject to discern objects that stand out among other objects doesn’t seem to be 
a fishy causal power. We don’t need to imagine a farfetched thought experiment to unearth 
such a causal power. It is exactly the type of causal power that we would naturally attribute to 
visual experiences (if we wanted to do so). So, the case we have considered doesn’t give us 
epiphenomenal qualia, perfectly or not perfectly. 
Perhaps we can imagine cases where experiences that instantiate the same quale are as different 
from each other as two states could be (with respect to their causal powers). But for that, we 
don’t really need inverted qualia. We need mad qualia. 
VII. Mad Qualia 
Recall Lewis’s story of the madman. The madman’s pain feels exactly like our pain. (I am 
assuming that we are ‘typical’ subjects of experience.) Our pain and the madman’s pain are 
qualitatively identical; they instantiate the very same quale. But the madman’s pain has an 
entirely different causal profile than our pain.10 (See the opening passage above.11) The 
madman’s case is a case of mad qualia. More generally, mad qualia cases are cases where the 
very same quale is instantiated by experiences that have entirely different causal profiles. It 
follows from the characterisation of what makes a quale perfectly epiphenomenal that if mad 
qualia are nomologically possible, then (and only then) qualia---or at least those qualia which 
can ‘go mad’ (i.e. those qualia for which mad qualia cases are possible)---are perfectly 
epiphenomenal.  
It looks like we finally have a test for perfectly epiphenomenal qualia: find some qualia that 
can go mad, and then establish QE for at least those qualia; make an argument that any quale 
can go mad, establish QE once and for all. But that seems to shift the question to the following: 
What does it take for mad qualia to be nomologically possible? Focusing on the case of mad 
pain, let us now consider this question. For the madman’s case, we need two central ingredients. 
First, the madman’s experience has to be a pain experience. Second, that experience has to 
have the strange causal profile that the story tells us. Let’s focus on the first of these ingredients.  
                                                          
10 It is important to note that causal powers can be dispositional. In a stronger reading, the madman’s 
pain is not even disposed to bring about S1, S2 …Sn and O1, O2, … On in response to I1, I2 … In. 
11 To be precise, the opening passage doesn’t tell us that normal pain and mad pain have entirely 
different causal profiles. As far as that passage goes, normal pain and mad pain may have grossly-but-
not-entirely different causal profiles. However, I will be assuming henceforth that normal pain and mad 
pain have entirely different causal profiles.  
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What does it take for the madman to be in pain? Or indeed, what does it take for any person to 
be in pain? According to Lewis (1972; 1989), for a person to be in pain, she needs to be in the 
state that realizes being in pain in her species (or in a relevant population). The relevant sense 
of realization here is that of occupying a causal role. The typical causal role of pain, remember, 
is that it is caused by inputs I1, I2 … In, it causes states S1, S2 …Sn and behavioural outputs O1, 
O2, … On. Let’s give in to the philosophical fiction that being in C-fibre stimulation (C-fs for 
short) is the state that is caused by inputs I1, I2 … In and that causes states S1, S2 …Sn and 
behavioural outputs O1, O2, … On in humans. In other species, for example in some pain-
capable Martian species, different physical states may play this causal role. Now, the madman 
is a human. So, in order for the madman to be in pain, he has to be in a state that occupies the 
relevant causal role: being caused by inputs I1, I2 … In, causing states S1, S2 …Sn and 
behavioural outputs O1, O2, … On in humans. But we also know that the state that he is in is 
not caused by I1, I2 … In; nor does it cause states S1, S2 …Sn and behavioural outputs O1, O2, 
… On. How can this be? Lewis’s answer is that the madman is indeed in that very state, which 
we agreed is C-fs. He is in pain because he is in the state that realizes pain in his population; 
but ‘he is hooked up wrong’ (Lewis 1980: 219).12 That is, he is in C-fs, and C-fs indeed has the 
aforementioned causal profile; but there is something wrong in the madman’s neural circuitry 
such that in him, C-fs is caused by moderate exercise on empty stomach and causes leg-
crossings and finger-snappings.  
There is something wrong with this story. As Shoemaker (1981: 97) points out, there are two 
senses in which one can be said to be in a state that realizes pain (or any mental property for 
that matter). First, one can be in a physical state which is a core realizer of being in pain. Call 
this core realizer state CR. Whether a human-person is in pain depends on whether she is in 
CR, and her being in CR is ‘in some sense constitutive of [her] being in pain’ (ibid.). But this 
will be so only if she is also in a total realizer state for being in pain---and this is the second 
sense in which one can be said to be in a state that realizes pain. Call this total realizer TR. This 
state TR will be a state that includes, alongside CR, the relevant background condition that is 
expressed by ‘being physically constituted in such a way that CR plays the causal role of being 
caused by inputs I1, I2 … In, causing states S1, S2 …Sn and behavioural outputs O1, O2, … On’. 
Now, although being in CR will not be sufficient, metaphysically or nomologically, for being 
in pain (because it will not be sufficient for being in a state that occupies the relevant causal 
role), being in TR will be.  
What is wrong in Lewis’s case of the madman is that the madman is clearly not in a total 
realizer state for being in pain. He is in C-fs alright, and if the relevant background conditions 
had been present, his being in C-fs would have constituted his being in pain. But the madman 
is ‘hooked up wrong’, hence the relevant background conditions are not there. If our sole reason 
for thinking that the madman is in pain is that he is in the appropriate physical state for being 
so, since he is not in that physical state, it is odd to think that he is in pain.  
In fact, if being in pain is a matter of being in some appropriate physical state that plays a causal 
role, the madman’s case shouldn’t be nomologically possible. Let me put this point in terms of 
a dilemma: either the madman has a total realizer of pain or he doesn’t. If he does, then he is 
in pain, but the core realizer of his pain indeed plays the causal role that is characteristic of 
pain. If he doesn’t, then the core realizer doesn’t play this causal role (and perhaps it is caused 
by moderate exercise on empty stomach and causes leg-crossings and finger-snappings), but 
                                                          
12 With this ‘hooked up wrong’ comment, differently from the classic absent and inverted qualia cases, 
we have an explanation of how the relevant experience is detached from its characteristic causal role. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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he isn’t in pain. All this seems to suggest that if the madman’s case is nomologically possible, 
then there is more to being in pain than being in some physical state that plays some causal 
role. And more generally, if mad qualia are possible, experiences seem to be ‘over and above’ 
physical states.  
Here is a caveat, which I must concede. Surely, just because the particular physicalist 
assumptions considered in the previous four paragraphs can’t account for the nomological 
possibility of mad qualia, it shouldn’t thereby follow that no physicalist theory can do this. But 
what we have seen seems to suggest that the nomological possibility of mad qualia is in tension 
with the dominant variety of non-reductive physicalism, namely realization physicalism (e.g. 
Melnyk 2003; Shoemaker 2007; Wilson 2011). Also, recall that, because of the possibility of 
Martian pain, we have already ruled out reductive physicalism (a.k.a., the type-identity theory). 
Realization physicalism makes it a requirement that all mental properties are physically 
realized. Although the details of how ‘realization’ should be understood varies from one 
theorist to another, a shared commitment is that the causal profile of a realized property is an 
essential ingredient in what it takes to realize it.  
To expand on this last claim, consider the debate between Gillett’s (2002; 2003; 2010) so-
called dimensioned view of realization and what he calls the flat views of realization. 
According to the flat views, a realized property and its realizer are instantiated by the same 
object, and according to Gillett, such views endorse the claim that the causal powers of a 
realized property are also the causal powers of its realizer.13 Gillett’s dimensioned view on the 
other hand rejects this picture. Instead, Gillett argues that realizing properties (and relations) 
are instantiated by the constituent parts of the object which instantiates the realized property. 
If this is true, Gillett argues, the causal powers of a realized property will not typically be had 
by the causal powers of the realizer properties, as the latter will be properties of micro objects 
whereas the former will be properties of macro objects. But Gillett still takes the causal powers 
of realized and realizer properties to be essential to his account of realization: higher-level 
properties of macro objects are (‘dimensionally’) realized by lower-level properties of micro-
objects because higher-level properties confer their causal powers on macro objects in virtue 
of the conferral of the causal powers by lower-level properties on micro-objects. Another 
realization theorist who rejects the flat view (without employing Gillett’s terminology) is 
Pereboom (2002; 2011). But again, the causal powers of realized properties are an essential 
component of Pereboom’s account of realization: higher-level properties are realized by lower-
level properties because the causal powers of the former are ‘constituted’ by the causal powers 
of the latter. What this constitution comes down to is not relevant to our purposes here. What 
is important is the observation that virtually all prominent accounts of realization attempt to 
explain realization partially in terms of the causal powers of realized properties.14 
Now, if realization physicalism is true and hence all experiences must be physically realized, 
and moreover that the realization relation must take into account the causal profile of a realized 
property, then it would be very mysterious, from a realization physicalist point of view anyway, 
for an experience type to have no robust causal profile. If experiences are not type-identical 
with physical states and also are over and above physical states that occupy causal roles, what 
could explain the fact that two experiences, E1 and E2, are instances of the same experience 
type (e.g. being in pain)? The only option would be to appeal to some brute phenomenal aspect 
of those experiences: E1 and E2 are instances of the same experience type because they feel the 
same, and nothing other than this constitutes the fact that they are instances of the same 
                                                          
13 Gillett attributes the flat theory to Shapiro (2000), Clapp (2001), Wilson (2009). 
14 See Baysan (2015) for a more detailed discussion of the aforementioned realization theories. 
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experience type. So, seemingly, in order to account for the possibility of mad qualia, we need 
to appeal to brute phenomenal facts, and such facts appear to fly in the face of physicalism.  
VIII. Conclusions 
I have characterised mad qualia cases as cases in which the very same quale is instantiated by 
experiences that have entirely different causal profiles. I then argued that if being in pain 
consists in having some physical property that plays some causal or functional role, then mad 
pain is not nomologically possible. And more generally, if having an experience (i.e. having a 
mental state that instantiates a quale) consists in having some physical property that plays some 
causal or functional role, then mad qualia are not nomologically possible. If physicalism is true, 
then mad qualia shouldn’t be nomologically possible. To contrapose: if mad qualia are 
nomologically possible, then physicalism should be false. This is what we can tentatively 
conclude from the discussion in §VII. 
I have also argued that a quale is perfectly epiphenomenal if and only if it is nomologically 
possible that there are experiences that instantiate this very same quale but they are entirely 
different in their causal profiles. This was the conclusion of §IV. From the characterisation of 
mad qualia, it follows that qualia are perfectly epiphenomenal just in case mad qualia are 
nomologically possible. More precisely, a quale is perfectly epiphenomenal just in case that 
quale can ‘go mad’ (i.e. a mad quale case is possible for it). From this and the conclusion of 
§VII, it follows that if qualia are perfectly epiphenomenal, then physicalism should be false. 
This is not a trivial result---though I can imagine that it might strike some as one. This would 
be a trivial result if it were established that all and only nonphysical properties are 
epiphenomenal. But this is not established. In §II, I sought an argument from qualia 
nonphysicalism to QE, and concluded that a property’s being nonphysical doesn’t thereby 
constitute grounds for its being epiphenomenal. That there are nonphysical yet non-
epiphenomenal properties is an open alternative---and it is one that nonphysicalist philosophers 
can and do appeal to. Moreover, and more interestingly, that there are physical yet 
epiphenomenal properties is also an open, but underexplored, alternative. First, it is not part of 
the definition of ‘physical’ that something physical must have causal powers. Second, from the 
account of epiphenomenal properties that I have appealed to in this paper, it seems possible 
that there can be physical properties that are perfectly epiphenomenal. A property is perfectly 
epiphenomenal if and only if it is nomologically possible that its bearers share no first-class 
causal powers. Now, suppose that there is a disjunctive property that consists of the disjunction 
of all nomologically possible physical properties. This property will be physical, as it has only 
physical properties as constituents; but it has a very good claim to be perfectly epiphenomenal 
because there is no first-class causal power that is nomologically guaranteed by the possession 
of this property. Now, I am not sure if we should admit such a property in our ontology. But if 
we shouldn’t, I would like to think that it has something to do with the fact that it is a perfectly 
epiphenomenal property. Either way, the example is serviceable for the claim that the concept 
of a ‘physical property’ doesn’t entail that a physical property must be a non-epiphenomenal 
one.  
I don’t know if mad qualia are nomologically possible or not. Likewise, I don’t know if 
physicalism about qualia is true or not. But what we have seen suggests that qualia are 
epiphenomenal if and only if mad qualia are nomologically possible, and the possibility of mad 
qualia is in tension with physicalism. Although nonphysicalism and epiphenomenalism about 
qualia have long been strongly associated, I think it wasn’t clear in what ways these two 
positions were really connected, and what could ground this association. I believe I have shown 
14 
 
how these views are linked and hopefully offered a framework that can explain their 
association.15  
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